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Abstract
We build an agent-based model to study how fiscal multipliers can change over the
business cycle. Our approach considers the economy as a complex evolving system.
In that, fiscal state-dependent multipliers are emergent disequilibrium phenomenon
stemming from the interaction among an ecology of heterogeneous agents. We study
fiscal multipliers in response to different microeconomic shocks hitting the economy.
We show that deficit-spending fiscal policy dampens the effect of a shock and lowers
its persistence. Moreover, we show that the size and dynamics of the fiscal multi-
plier is inversely related to the evolution of credit rationing in the aftermath of the
shock. We also investigate the effects of two different balanced budget rules. In the
first type of such experiments, government expenditure is constrained to be equal
to tax revenues of each period. In the second one the tax rate is eventually raised to
balance a given level of government expenditure. We show that fiscal multipliers are
very low with both balanced-budget rules. Finally, we show that fiscal multipliers
are higher into more leveraged economies.
Keywords: Keynesian economics, Fiscal Multipliers, Corridor Effects, Agent-based
models, Liquidity constraints
JEL classification: E63, E21, C63
1 Introduction
In the economics of Keynes, agents who are unable to sell as much as they would like
at prevailing prices restrict demands in other markets. Unemployed workers cut their
consumption demand. Demand-constrained firms restrict their demand for labor. Then
supplies and demands depend on the current income and and multiplier effects matter.
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The recent crisis has revealed that multiplier values can be significantly higher in eco-
nomic downturns than in normal times. For instance, in 2009 the IMF had estimated
that multipliers in developed countries averaged about 0.5, while it now calculates that
they range from 0.9 to 1.7 during the Great Recession (see Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).
The notion of state-dependent multipliers, corroborated by a growing body of recent em-
pirical research (see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Bachmann and Sims, 2012),
is reminiscent of Leijonhufvud (1973) corridor theory. According to Leijonhufvud, “inside
the corridor, multiplier-repercussions are weak and dominated by neoclassical market ad-
justments, while outside the corridor, they should be strong enough for effects of shocks
to the prevailing state to be endogenously amplified” (Leijonhufvud, 1973). One explana-
tion for the corridor effect is the tightness of the liquidity constraints faced by households.
During booms liquidity constraints are non-binding, and households engage into standard
permanent-income consumption smoothing. Consequently, aggregate consumption de-
pend less on current income and the size of the fiscal multiplier is low. In contrast, during
economic downturns liquidity constraints are binding, and consumption is more sensitive
to current income variations. Recent DSGE models (e.g. Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012)
have modeled consumers debt overhangs as exogenous, or have investigated corridor effects
in frameworks with limited agent heterogeneity. In our model agents have heterogeneous
financial conditions and debt overhangs may emerge endogenously. Moreover, the size
of fiscal multipliers affected by monetary policy as well as by structural conditions (e.g.
distribution of household leverage). Our approach considers the economy as a complex
evolving system. In that, fiscal state-dependent multipliers are emergent disequilibrium
phenomenon stemming from the interaction among an ecology of heterogeneous agents.
We study fiscal multipliers in response to different microeconomic shocks hitting the econ-
omy. We show that deficit-spending fiscal policy dampens the effect of a shock and lowers
its persistence. Moreover, we show that the size and dynamics of the fiscal multiplier is
inversely related to the evolution of credit rationing in the aftermath of the shock. We
also investigate the effects of two different balanced budget rules. In the first type of
such experiments, government expenditure is constrained to be equal to tax revenues of
each period. We find, that fiscal multipliers are still time varying, but they are lower
and converge towards a zero value. Similar results are observed under the second type
of balanced budget rule, according to which the tax rate is eventually raised to balance
a given level of government expenditure. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the model. Section 3 discusses the steady state conditions of the model. Section
4 presents some preliminary simulation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 A simple endowment economy
There are N heterogeneous households. Each household i has access to a given amount of
a homogeneous input good (’wheat’) that she can gather at no cost, but that she cannot
use for consumption . In order to consume, each household has to sell her endowment
good to homogeneous firms (’the mills’) that use it to produce an output good (’flour’).
The output good is purchased by households and used for their consumption
Each mill produces the consumption good on demand by using a constant returns to
scale technology. The production function of a mill j is Yjt = Ljt. This implies that total
output is simply
Yt = Lt
where Lt is the amount of wheat purchased. Mills always buys the wheat from each
households in proportion to the household share of total wheat available. In addition,
each firm can buy all the input good she needs at the price Pl up to to the total amount
of input available (Lmax). Furthermore, the mill produces at zero profit so that the final
price of the output is simply Po = Pl. Finally, notice that the above assumptions imply
that the level of output of the mill will (and thus household incomes) will be determined
by the level of overall consumption demand (up to the level where the input constraint
Lmax becomes binding).
Each household has a desired level of consumption Zi, that we assume to be constant
over time Once desired consumption is determined it is possible to identify two classes of
agents: savers and borrowers. Savers are households whose current liquid wealth Wit is
larger than desired consumption (i.e. Zi ≤ Wit). At the other extreme, borrowers have
liquid wealth Wit that is lower than desired consumption Zit (i.e. Zi > Wit). Savers
can always finance their consumption with their own wealth. Accordingly, consumption
of this class of agents is always equal to their desired level. In contrast, borrowers need
financing from the credit sector to satisfy their consumption plans.
In the credit sector there is a representative bank that stocks the wealth of all agents
and grants credit to borrowers. Total credit supply is set as a multiple of the net worth
of the bank EBt (e.g. Delli Gatti et al., 2005)
TSt = kE
B
t , k > 0 (1)
where k is the credit multiplier. We assume an endogenous money framework, so that
→ k > 1. Furthermore, credit is allocated to agents using a pecking order (see Dosi et al.,
2013) that depends on the on the ratio between household’s wealth Wit and her credit
demand CDit.
Wit
CDit
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where CDit is equal to the difference between the borrower’s desired consumption and
her wealth
CDit = Zit −Wit
The above assumptions imply that total credit demand can be lower or higher than total
credit supply. In the former case all borrowers are able to get credit from the bank. In
the latter case some borrowers are partially or totally rationed in the credit market. The
lower is the position of the household in the pecking order, the higher is her probability
of being credit-rationed. Borrowers who are denied credit are not able to satisfy their
consumption plan. Their actual consumption is equal to their wealth Wit.
The bank sets the interest rate on loans rb by applying a mark-up µb on the baseline
interest rate r set by the central bank. Likewise, the interest rate paid on deposits, rs is
determined by applying a mark-down µs on the central bank interest rate. We get
rb = r(1 + µb)
rs = r(1 + µs)
(2)
Bank liabilities, LBt are determined as the difference between assets (equal to total
credit supply) and net-worth of the bank
LBt = kE
B
t − EBt = (k − 1)EBt
Bank profits, piBt are simply equal to
piBt = r
b
t (kE
B
t )− rs(k − 1)EBt = [rs + k(rb − rs)]EBt (3)
The law of motion of bank’s net worth is
EBt = E
B
t−1 + pi
B
t −
N∑
i=1
BDit
Bank profits are distributed to a homogeneous class of agents (”the bankers”) if bad debt
is zero and are not distributed otherwise. The bankers fully consume their income.
Let us now turn to describing fiscal policy. We assume that taxation is proportional to
income at the tax rate t so that disposable income of household i is simply yDit = (1−τ)yit.
The government sets consumption level and the tax rate according to different fiscal rules.
Government debt (if any) is purchased by the central bank. Aggregate demand ADt
determined as the sum of households and government consumption, respectively Ct and
Gt, plus the consumption of bankers if any ( and equal to bank profits pi
B
t ). As long as
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the constraint Lmax is not binding aggregate income is determined by aggregate demand.
Formally, we get:
Yt = ADt = Ct +Gt + pi
B
t
Total households income Y Ht is total income minus the income of bankers, i.e. Y
H
t =
Y − piBt .
Finally, let us discuss households’ balance sheet dynamics. Let define βit = Zi/Wit as
the propensity to consume out of wealth of agent i at time t. It follows that, βit > 1 if the
household is a borrower and βit <= 1 if she is a saver. We assume that consumption loans
must be fully repaid at the end of each period. The same occurs for the remuneration of
savings. It follows that the law of motion of agent’s wealth is
Wit+1 = (1− τ)yit − (1 + rb)(βit − 1)Wit (4)
if the agent is a borrower, and
Wit+1 = (1− τ)yit + (1 + rs)(1− βit)Wit (5)
if the agent is a saver. In the above equations rb and rs (with rb ≥ rs) are respectively the
borrowers’ and lenders’ interest rate. Households who are unable to repay their debt go
bankrupt. From 4 one gets that the condition for bankruptcy is simply that household’s
resources at the beginning of the period are lower than debt plus interests, i.e.
(1− τ)yit < (1 + rb)(βit − 1)Wit
The above can also be re-expressed using consumption levels
(1− τ)yit < (1 + rb)(Cit −Wit)
Once bankruptcy occurs the wealth of the household is reset to zero and the bank gets a
credit loss equal to
BDit = (1 + rb)(Cit −Wit)− (1− τ)yit
Bankrupted households are denied access to the credit market for Tdefault periods.
The sequence of events unfolding in each period is the following
• Desired consumption of the period is determined. Households credit demand is
determined
• Government consumption and the government balance is determined
• Total credit supply is determined. Credit is allocated to consumers. Actual private
consumption is determined
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• Aggregate income of the period is determined and distributed
• Taxes are collected
• Debt is repaid. Household’s wealth is determined. Household bankruptcy is deter-
mined
3 Steady State Conditions
Before carrying simulation experiments we identify the steady state conditions of the
model. By steady state here, we mean a state of the economy where levels of all microe-
conomic variables (households wealth, households income, households consumption, debt,
profits of the bank) are constant and where levels of all macroeconomic variables (aggre-
gate consumption, aggregate government expenditure, tax revenues, aggregate income)
are also constant.
To find the steady state conditions of the model described in the previous section we
focus on steady state conditions for households wealth. Indeed, household wealth plays
a central role in the model, as it determines actual consumption, aggregate income, tax
revenues (and thus government balance). In addition, by determining the overall amount
of consumption loans it affects banks’ revenues and net worth. First, notice that the
assumption that each mill buys wheat from a household in proportion to the household’s
share of total wheat implies that each household is entitled a time-invariant share of total
household income. Let us label this share by αi. If Y
H
t is total household income of the
period, then disposable income of each household; yit is equal to
yit = αi(1− τ)Y Ht
As we said in the previous section, households whose marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth is lower or equal to 1 always satisfy their consumption plans. In contrast,
agents with βi > 1 need to borrow to achieve their desired consumption. We focus on
steady states of the model where credit rationing is absent. Accordingly, all borrowers
are able to get their desired consumption level. Using this fact, we get that the steady
state level of wealth household i is
w∗i =
αi(1− τ)Y H∗
[1− (1 + rb)(1− β∗i )]
(6)
if the agent is a borrower and
w∗i =
αi(1− τ)Y H∗
[1− (1 + rs)(1− β∗i )]
(7)
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if the agent is a saver. Also, notice that the above steady state levels are stable if the
following conditions are satisfied
| (1 + rb)(1− β∗i ) |< 1
for a borrower
| (1 + rs)(1− β∗i ) |< 1
for a saver.
Aggregate consumption must be constant in steady state. Thus, we can express steady
state individual consumption, C∗i as a fraction of steady state aggregate consumption C
∗
C∗i = γ
∗
iC
∗,
N∑
i=1
γ∗i = 1 (8)
Moreover, by exploiting the fact that, by definition, C∗i = β
∗
i w
∗
i and that C
∗ = (1−τ)Y H∗
we get the following relations between individual consumption shares γ∗i and individual
marginal propensity to consume β∗i
β∗i αi
[1− (1 + rb)(1− β∗i )]
= γ∗i (9)
for a borrower and
β∗i αi
[1− (1 + rs)(1− β∗i )]
= γ∗i (10)
for a saver. Solving for the above equations for β∗i we get
β∗i =
γ∗i r
b
[γ∗i rb + (γ
∗
i − αi)]
(11)
and
β∗i =
γ∗i r
s
[γ∗i rs + (γ
∗
i − αi)]
(12)
for a saver.1. Furthermore, by exploiting Equations 11 and 12 we designed an algo-
rithm that, for a given distributions of income shares {αi}, randomly assigns consumption
weights to households and computes the values of β∗i so that the fraction of borrowers in
the population is 0 < η∗ < 1 (and the one of savers is 1− η∗).
1Incidentally, notice that the above functions are increasing in α∗i and decreasing in γ
∗
i . It follows
that, if we impose that all agents have the same consumption share in steady state (γi = 1/N,∀i) then
borrowers should be concentrated in the upper part of the income distribution.
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4 Simulation Experiments
We now discuss the results of the simulation experiments using different fiscal rules in
the framework of the model described in Section 2. In these simulation experiments we
assumed that the economy was initially in the steady state described in Section 3. We then
shocked the steady state by assuming that a given fraction of households goes bankrupt
and tracking the dynamics of output under different types of fiscal rules. In particular,
we considered three types of fiscal rules:
• deficit-spending rule. The government keeps the level government spending at the
steady state level, and it is allowed to create a deficit if tax revenues fall below the
steady state level
• balanced-budget rule I. Government spending is equal to tax revenues in every period
• balanced-budget rule II. The government keeps the level government spending at the
steady state level. The tax rate is adjusted accordingly so that tax revenues are
equal to government spending in every period.
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Figure 1: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income. Deficit-
spending rule. The values in the legend correspond to different intensities of government
expenditures and tax rates.
In each of the above experiment the level of government expenditure (and the tax
rate when required) is set as a fraction of the steady state income level, according to a
coefficient that captures the “intensity” of fiscal policy in the model. We then repeat each
experiment for different intensities of fiscal policy.
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Let us begin with the analysis of the deficit-spending rule. Figure 1 shows the evolution
of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income in the aftermath of a bankruptcy
shocks. The plot shows two results of the model. First, higher levels of government
expenditures (corresponding to higher fiscal policies intensities in the figure) reduce the
magnitude of the effects of the shocks. In other words the higher the level of government
expenditure the lower is the fall in aggregate output in the aftermath of a shock. Moreover,
higher levels of government expenditure lower the persistence of the shock and favors a
quicker recovery to the steady state level of income.
In light of the above results we now proceed to calculate fiscal multipliers corresponding
to different levels of fiscal policy intensity. More precisely, we calculate fiscal impact
multipliers as follows
kki(t) =
Yk(t)− Yi(t)
Gk(t)−Gi(t) (13)
In the above expression kki(t) is the fiscal multiplier at time t corresponding to the exper-
iment with govt. expenditure intensity k in relation to the experiment govt. expenditure
intensity i.
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of fiscal impact multipliers for different intensities of
government expenditure and following a bankruptcy shock. First, the values of fiscal
multipliers follow an inverse U-shaped pattern, and peak values are reached after the
through of the recession (compare Fig. 2 to Figure 1). Moreover, many fiscal multipliers
have peak values that are significantly higher than one. In particular, the value of the peak
multiplier is decreasing in the level of the government expenditure. This latter result can
be understood by noticing that the impact multipliers are calculated as a ratio between
the variation in aggregate income and the variation in government expenditure. As after-
shock fall in output is at most of 10% (check the blue line in Figure 1, corresponding to
the case where fiscal policy is absent), and given that aggregate output is bounded above
by the capacity constraint Lmax it comes to no surprise that government intensities values
equal or higher than 10% are associated with peak multipliers that are lower than one.
Let us now turn to analyse the evolution of fiscal multipliers in relation to the degree
of credit rationing in the economy. Figure 3 compares the evolution of fiscal multipliers to
the one of the ratio between actual and desired consumption. A value of the latter lower
than one indicates the presence of credit rationing because it implies that some borrowers
are unable to satisfy their desired consumption plans and their consumption is limited
by their current liquid wealth. Figure 3 shows that the evolution of fiscal multipliers
is inversely related to the evolution of actual-to-desired consumption ratio, and thus to
credit rationing in the economy. However, the dynamics of fiscal multipliers appears to be
lagging the one of credit rationing. This delivers an important results of the model, namely
government expenditure is able to trigger variation in output insofar as it is able to let
borrowers escape from the credit rationing trap and to get back to effective consumption
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Figure 2: Evolution of fiscal multipliers. Deficit-spending rule. All multipliers are calcu-
lated in relation to an intensity i = 0.02 of government expenditure (see also Eq. 13).
levels compatible with their desired plans. Moreover, such a process of “re-leveraging” is
faster the stronger is the level of government expenditure in the economy. This is showed
by the fact that the peak multiplier is reached much faster for higher levels of government
expenditure (see Figure 2).
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Figure 3: Evolution of fiscal multipliers (left scale) and ratio between actual and desired
consumption (right scale). Deficit-spending rule.
All the above discussion related to experiments with the deficit-spending rule. How
do the above results change if we allow for balanced-budget rules? Figure 4 compare
the evolution of fiscal multipliers across different fiscal rules. As the plot shows quite
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Figure 4: Deficit-spending vs. balanced-budget multipliers. In the plot “baseline” refers
to the deficit-spending rule, “bal. budget 1” refers to the balanced-budget rule with
endogenous government expenditure, “bal. budget 2” to the balanced budget rule with
endogenous tax rate.
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Figure 5: Fiscal multipliers for different initial fractions of borrowers in the economy.
Deficit-spending rule
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starkly balanced-budget fiscal multipliers are always very low. On one hand, decreas-
ing government expenditure to adapt it to falling tax revenues (as it is implied by the
balanced-budget rule with endogenous government expenditure), does not help in trig-
gering the re-leveraging process discussed before and restore pre-shock output levels. On
the other hand rising the tax rate to fully balance government expenditure (as it is im-
plied by the balanced budget rule with endogenous tax rate) further depresses household
disposable incomes that are already falling after the shock and further reinforce credit
rationing and de-leveraging in the economy.
To conclude, Figure 5 compares the evolution of fiscal multipliers (with the deficit-
spending rule) for different initial shares of borrowers in the households population. The
latter is a measure of the degree of leverage in the economy as it captures the extent to
which total consumption in the economy depends on consumption loans. The plot in the
figure clearly shows that fiscal multipliers are growing in the degree of debt leverage in
the economy. The same is observed for the magnitude and persistence of the effects of a
bankruptcy shock (not shown). The result that multipliers are higher in more leveraged
economy is explained by the fact that - to repeat - a greater share of consumption depends
on bank loans in such economies and that bankruptcy shocks are going to generate higher
degrees of credit rationing. It follows that the re-leveraging process triggered by deficit-
spending fiscal policy is going to be more pervasive in such economies and, thus, able to
lead to higher increases in output in the aftermath of the shock.
5 Conclusions
We built a simple agent-based model to study how fiscal multipliers are affected by liq-
uidity constraints in the economy. The model features two classes of heterogenous agents:
savers, who can finance desired consumption with their liquid wealth, and borrowers who
need bank’s loans to satisfy their desired consumption plans. In the model bank’s credit
supply depends on bank’s net worth that is affected by bad debt (if any). Moreover, the
government taxes agents and purchases goods according to different fiscal rules. Finally,
aggregate income is determined by aggregate demand. In such a framework we showed
that small bankruptcy shocks can trigger wide and persistent falls in output. The mag-
nitude and persistence of the shock is inversely related to the intensity of government
expenditure in the economy. Moreover, we showed that fiscal multipliers can be signifi-
cantly higher than one during recessions, and that the value of the multiplier is inversely
related to the degree of credit rationing in the economy. Finally, we studied fiscal mul-
tipliers across different fiscal regimes and degrees of debt leverage in the economy. We
showed that fiscal multipliers associated with balanced budget rules are very low com-
pared to the ones associated with deficit-spending rules. Moreover, fiscal multipliers are
higher in more leveraged economies. We plan to extend the model in several directions, by
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exploring further fiscal rules, and to investigate the robustness of results under different
consumption behaviors.
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